Here we go again. Another close Democratic primary, another bitter intraparty fight over superdelegates. We have Sanders supporters crying foul, and Clinton supporters rolling their eyes. So what is it? Oligarchy or no big deal? To understand today’s debate, it’s necessary to understand the history of how things were before superdelegates, why they were created, and what has happened since.
Here’s the history: Through 1968, party insiders picked nominees in smoke filled rooms. Some states did hold primaries, binding their delegates to vote the way the people of the state voted, but they were the minority. The majority of states used the caucus system, which was far less democratic than it is today, and allowed Party insiders and elites to control the nomination process.
In the 1968 Democratic primary, Hubert Humphrey was the establishment candidate, running against several anti-Vietnam war candidates, including Senator Robert Kennedy, who was tragically assassinated in June of that year. Hubert did not bother to campaign in a single primary state, and won only caucus votes, but was nominated at the convention nonetheless. Anti-war and civil rights activists rioted outside the convention and were brutally attacked by police under orders from the Democratic mayor of Chicago. Humphrey went on to lose the general election to Richard Nixon.
After 1968, the Party did some soul searching, and introduced a number of reforms that made the Democratic primary system much more democratic, removing the excessive power of Party insiders and giving most of the power to regular rank-and-file voters. Many states, in response to the new rules, switched from caucuses to far more democratic primaries to allocate their delegates.
In the 1972 Democratic primary, under the new rules, Senator George McGovern won the nomination. McGovern was a very progressive, anti-war candidate, beloved by the left and especially the youth. But the Party elites were angry at their loss of status under the new rules (partially authored by McGovern). They had preferred Ed Muskie for the nomination, a more establishment politician, and after Muskie’s campaign fizzled, supported Hubert Humphrey despite his previous loss. They refused to give McGovern their support, either in the form of a qualified VP, fundraising, or even positive statements to the press. Some even supported Nixon in the general election. Without backing from the Party establishment, McGovern lost to Nixon by a landslide, dashing the hopes of the anti-war movement.
In the 1976 Democratic primary, an unexpected upstart senator from Georgia, Jimmy Carter, won the nomination. He also was not the Party establishment favorite, but gained more grudging support from them than McGovern had. He won a close victory and led what was, in hindsight, a very progressive Democratic presidency. But Carter made no friends in the Party establishment during his tenure as president, and in the 1980 Democratic primary had a rare challenge against a sitting Democratic president from Senator Ted Kennedy. Carter won the primary, and eventually the nomination, despite an attempt by Ted Kennedy to change the rules at the Convention to undo the will of Democratic voters. But Carter’s image was weakened by the lack of support from Party leaders and the bruising primary, as well as historical circumstance, and he lost badly to Ronald Reagan.
At this point, Party leaders had had enough of democracy. They blamed the last two losses on the new democratic system and sought to install some safeguards against the will of Democratic voters. Enter superdelegates.
Officially known as unpledged delegates, superdelegates are federal elected officials, former major elected officials such as presidents, and leaders of the Democratic Party. They get an automatic vote for the candidate of their choosing at the Democratic National Convention where the presidential nominee is chosen. Their percentage of the total number of delegates has fluctuated, from 14% when the system was implemented, up to 20% in 2008, down to 15% in this election.
Since their adoption, superdelegates have not decided a single nomination, though they become controversial whenever there’s a close race. In 2008, superdelegates were a major topic, with an early lead for Clinton, defections to Obama, and a primary race close enough that superdelegates could have decided it if they exercised their power. No one was very comfortable with that, and there was a concerted effort by Party reformers in 2010 to get rid of superdelegates.
That effort was scuttled by the DNC Rules Committee, which decided that it would never pass through the larger DNC organization, since everyone in the DNC is a superdelegate, and wouldn’t vote against their own interests. One DNC Rules Committee member, James Roosevelt, Jr., turned logic on its head by stating that, “Clearly, the people at the grassroots level should be the predominant voice. But if you don’t give elected officials a real voice, they are basically second-class citizens.” As a compromise, the DNC Rules Committee simply increased the total number of delegates to decrease the percentage of superdelegates from 20% to 15%.
And now here we are in 2016. The difference is that in 2008, both candidates were fairly establishment. While Clinton held an early lead in commitments from superdelegates, her advantage was 169 to 63 (3 to 1), not 359 to 8 (45 to 1) as it is in this election. As Obama gained momentum, it was not difficult for superdelegates to start defecting his way, adding to his momentum until he beat Clinton on both fronts. This time around, the superdelegate opposition to Sanders, a true outsider, is staunch and unwavering. But the basic arguments for and against superdelegates remain the same.
The main argument against superdelegates is pretty straightforward: democracy. It is an uncomfortable fact that the Party that purports to be the champion of democracy, the Party with the word “democracy” as its root, would give a group of powerful, generally wealthier and more privileged people a much more powerful vote than rank and file voters.
In 2008, over 35 million voters voted in the Democratic primary to elect 3,434 national delegates, meaning each of these delegates represented over 10,000 votes. Therefore, each of the 823 superdelegate votes, which carried equal weight as elected delegates, was worth about 10,000 regular votes. Since we won’t know overall voter participation until this primary is over, the math for 2016 isn’t yet available, but should be right in that neighborhood or worse. Think about that: Every superdelegate vote carries the same weight as 10,000 regular votes. So much for one person, one vote.
But in practice, the major harm of superdelegates takes place long before the bigwigs start filing into the National Convention. Superdelegates sway the results of primary elections by publicly “pledging” their votes to a particular candidate before the regular voters have made their choice. This can certainly bias voters who are highly engaged and educated about Party rules, if they weigh approval by Party elites heavily in their decision. But the most insidious consequence is the reporting of the superdelegate pledges in the press, and how that influences voters less familiar with Party rules.
Most of the time the press either doesn’t understand or doesn’t bother to fully explain the difference between pledged delegates and superdelegates. The fact that superdelegates can and do switch allegiance, or that they have always voted with the winner of pledged delegates often goes unmentioned. So when a voter who doesn’t understand the arcane rules of the Democratic convention reads that so-and-so has a huge lead in total delegates, or superdelegates, that voter is apt to be misled into thinking the race is all but decided, and may not bother to go vote at their local caucus or primary.
On the other side of the superdelegates debate, people defending the system often point to ensuring electability of the eventual nominee. They hold up the losses of McGovern and Carter as proof that superdelegates are necessary. But these candidates may have fared better if Party elites had gotten fully behind them, or if historical circumstance had been a little kinder.
Putting all that aside, here is the record: While the no-superdelegate-system was in place, Democrats won one out of three elections. Since the superdelegate system has been in place, Democrats have won four out of eight. One third (of a very small sample) to one half, hardly conclusive. Further, in the time since we’ve had superdelegates, they have always voted for the choice of regular Democratic voters. So apparently rank-and-file voters aren’t all that bad at picking electable candidates after all.
Which brings me to my next point. Regular rank-and-file Democrats also want to win elections, and consider electability as a major factor in supporting a nominee. It is certainly plausible to suggest that we may not weigh insider status as heavily as superdelegates, but that is not necessarily a problem, as long as Party insiders are willing to follow our lead and get behind our democratically chosen candidates.
Supporters of the superdelegate system also point to a scenario in which a nominee who is far ahead in delegates has a scandal late in the campaign. In this scenario, it certainly would be useful to be able to reconsider our choice. But superdelegates are not a good way to do this. How and by whom would it be decided that the scandal was big enough to warrant overturning the democratic will of the voters? We aren’t able to take back our choices in other campaigns, and a primary campaign should be no different. It is an inherent risk of elections, and means that we must carefully vet our candidates, but is not a good excuse for propping up an undemocratic system.
There is a good argument to be had for giving Party leaders an automatic seat (if not a super vote) in the idea that Party elites should not have to go to caucuses and compete against regular voters to get a seat at the convention. It would certainly be awkward for President Obama to have to go to the D.C. caucus and compete with regular Democrats for a seat at the Convention, and it would also be wrong for him not to be at the Convention. I believe this is what Debbie Wasserman Schultz was trying to say in her much-maligned statement about Party elites not having to compete with grassroots activists.
But there’s an easy solution to that problem that does not involve giving Party leaders super votes. We can reserve delegate seats for Party leaders (assuming a reasonable definition of “party leader” that is a good deal more restrictive than it is today), but make them go as pledged delegates from their respective states. Party leaders get their place at the Convention, while still respecting the basic democratic principle of one person one vote.
Finally, while superdelegates have historically always ended up voting as the rank-and-file voters voted, doesn’t mean they always will. Nate Silver of FiveThirtyEight, has predicted that in a primary race where an establishment favored candidate loses the pledged delegate race by less than 5% to an establishment unfavored candidate, it is possible that superdelegates would in fact swing the vote in favor of the loser of the pledged delegate race. It would be hard to overstate how damaging and divisive to the Party that would be.
The superdelegate system is an unnecessary time bomb that predictably causes friction and division every time there’s a close Democratic primary. It causes far more problems than it solves, and weakens the position of Democrats when we advocate for greater democracy in other areas. How can we claim the moral high ground with this undemocratic system enshrined in our own nomination process? It’s time for the Democratic Party to take the training wheels off democracy and get rid of superdelegates.
